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The extent to which taxpayers are free to minimize their tax obliga- 
tions by choosing one legal form rather than another as the vehicle for a 
transaction or relationship has preoccupied lawyers and administrators 
since the inception of the federal income tax. There is a common 
awareness among practitioners that different legal procedures will 
often lead to different tax consequences, although in economic terms 
the end results are essentially the same. In selecting the form in which 
a proposed business transaction shall be cast, therefore, it is said to 
be vital for the tax planner to consider and evaluate "all of the pos- 
sible routes to his client's destination,"' and the ability to generate 
a multiplicity of formal alternatives, however sterile the exercise in 
any other context, is usually thought to be the true mark of a creative 
tax adviser.2 But one hastens to add that the planning job does not 
end there. The Internal Revenue Service does not regard itself in 
every case as bound by the taxpayer's choice of form, so that a plan 
which is "jigsaw cut" to the letter of the law may nevertheless be chal- 
lenged by the government for one reason or another.3 Hence the ability 
to perceive alternatives in great number can sometimes be a dangerous 
intelligence unless it is combined with a power to forecast the likely 
reaction of the Service and the courts to each of the alternatives in view. 
The courts themselves follow no single and consistent set of rules in 
deciding when to accept and when to disregard the taxpayer's choice of 
form, although there is a conclusory commonplace for either type of de- 
termination. Thus when declining to accept the taxpayer's choice of 
form the courts commonly assert as a matter of principle that the inci- 
dence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction and that 
mere form is not controlling.4 When, on the other hand, the choice of 
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B. 1950, University of California; J.D. 1953, 
University of Chicago. 
1. B. BITTKER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 55 (1965). 
2. "When one sees that a given business purpose might be achieved in a particular way, 
how does one find out whether there are other, possibly better, ways of accomplishing the 
same purpose? If you have found three possibilities, how can you be sure there is not a 
fourth? The answer, of course, is that the practitioner must rely on his own experience 
and training...." Id. 
3. Darrell, Sonme Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor in Regard to Tax Minimization 
Devices, N.Y.U. 8TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 983, 988-89 (1950). 
4. E.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S 331 (1945). 
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form is accepted, the appropriate maxim is that "there is nothing sinis- 
ter in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible."5 In 
practice the first principle means simply that the range of effective 
choice is limited in the situation under review, or indeed that the only 
route to the taxpayer's destination is the one that bears the highest tax. 
By contrast the second principle, when applicable, confirms that the 
availability of alternative legal procedures also gives the taxpayer a right 
of election with respect to the tax consequences. In a considerable mea- 
sure, the daily work of business and tax planning, and likewise the ad- 
ministrative and judicial work of the Service and the courts in this field, 
involves the quest for an understanding of and a suitable accommoda- 
tion between these conflicting postulates. 
More perhaps than any other single judge or commentator, Learned 
Hand was instrumental in the development of the interpretative princi- 
ples just mentioned. Beginning with an opinion involving the Corpo- 
rate Excise Tax Act of 1909,6 and ending almost forty years later with an 
obscure and troublesome dissent in the much debated Gilbert7 case, the 
relationship between form and substance in tax law engaged Hand's at- 
tention at fairly regular intervals during the entire span of his judicial 
career. His effort throughout, reflecting that of the tax bar itself, was to 
draw the line between permissible and impermissible tax avoidance by 
determining when the taxpayer's choice of form was to be respected- 
when a literal construction of the statute was appropriate-and when 
not. 
Hand's decisions on the subject of tax avoidance were more often crit- 
cized than praised by the tax bar; yet it was apparent at an early date 
that those decisions were likely to prove highly influential in the devel- 
opment of the law. His opinion in Helvering v. Gregory,8 which estab- 
lished his preeminence as a tax judge, was a major event in the history of 
tax administration in this country and is still among the most significant 
and best remembered judicial statements on the subject. The same can 
be said of his recapitulation of the corporate entity problem in National 
Investors Corp. v. HoeyY9 Most recently the Supreme Court paid Hand 
5. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion of 
Hand, J.). The proposition may have been given its ultimate expression by Justice Harlan, 
concurring in Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579-80 (1965): "Were it not for the 
tax laws, the respondent's transaction . . . would make no sense. . . . However, the tax 
laws exist as an economic reality in the businessman's world, much like the existence of 
a competitor. Businessmen plan their affairs around both, and a tax dollar is just as 
real as one derived from any other source." 
6. United States v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nav. Co., 251 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1918). 
7. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957). 
8. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
9. 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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the compliment of adopting his Gilbert'0 formulation as its own, just as 
it had done with his opinion in Gregory" twenty-five years before. And 
in all the writing that has appeared over the years on the function and 
responsibility of the tax adviser, there is hardly an essay that fails to in- 
clude some reference to or quotation from Hand's decisions, with the fa- 
mous lines in Commissioner v. Newman'2 being perhaps the most fre- 
quently cited and savored. 
His influence having been as considerable as it was, there may now be 
some value in attempting a synthesis and appraisal of Hand's thought 
on the pervasive question of form and substance in the tax law. 
I. Business Purpose and Corporate Entity 
Hand's opinions in the Gregory and Chisholm'3 cases, together with 
the extended series of decisions on recognition of the corporate entity 
which culminated in the National Carbide14 opinion, all in a sense be- 
long to a "period" in the development of his approach to form and sub- 
stance. That period, generally described, was one in which Hand was 
preoccupied not only with the issue of liberal as opposed to literal inter- 
pretation of the taxing statute as a means of dealing with tax avoidance, 
but with what perhaps was the more difficult problem of setting appro- 
priate limits once the decision had been made to pursue a liberal course. 
If his Gregory opinion represented the rejection of literalism as a stan- 
dard of statutory interpretation, the corporate entity decisions just as 
clearly represented an effort, in a closely related context, to prevent lib- 
eralism from exceeding proper bounds. 
As a lower court judge Hand's obligation to assimilate and give effect 
to the views of the Supreme Court on the question of corporate entity- 
particularly those expressed in Higgins v. Smith'5-necessarily compli- 
cated that effort. The Court had begun its consideration of the corpo- 
rate entity under the modem income tax by suggesting, though with am- 
ple reservation, that a distinction might be drawn between closely-held 
corporations, including wholly-owned subsidiaries, and public issue cor- 
porations, with the former being treated for certain tax purposes as in- 
10. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960). 
11. "The reasoning of the court below . . . leaves little to be said." Gregory v. Hel- 
vering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
12. 159 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1947), p. 441 & note 5 supra. 
13. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 
(1936). 
14. Commissioner v. National Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 
422 (1949). 
15. 308 U.S. 473 (1940). 
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separable from their shareholders. In Southern Pacific v. Lowe16 the 
Court held, at the taxpayer's urging, that income accrued to a parent 
corporation at the same time that it accrued to its wholly-owned subsid- 
iary, even though a dividend was not in fact declared until a subsequent 
year. The two corporations were found to be in substance identical owing 
to "the complete ownership and control which the [parent] possessed over 
the [subsidiary] as stockholder and in other capacities,'"17 so that in effect 
the subsidiary's income was deemed to have accrued directly to the par- 
ent. The Court warned, nevertheless, that its decision should be re- 
garded as turning upon "very special facts," and it presently became 
clear that no rule of general application to closely-held corporations had 
been intended. Thus, in Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co.18 
the Court held taxable a gain realized by a corporation on a sale of ap- 
preciated securities to its sole shareholder. Declining to consider the 
corporation and shareholder as anything but separate taxable entities, 
the Court in a brief opinion appeared to devitalize the Southern Pacific 
decision by stating that the latter "cannot be regarded as laying down 
any general rule authorizing disregard of corporate entity in respect of 
taxation."'19 And in subsequent decisions, at least prior to Higgins v. 
Smith, the Court either took pains to confirm the separate identity of 
corporation and shareholder or else reached results which can readily be 
explained without reference to the factor of shareholder ownership and 
control.20 
During the period preceding the Smith decision, Hand wrote opin- 
ions in nearly a dozen disregard-of-entity cases and participated without 
separate opinion in several more, including the Second Circuit's consid- 
eration of Smith21 itself. His own views on the status of the corporate en- 
tity for tax purposes were somewhat more constant than the Supreme 
Court's, as it seems, and although he conceded that the question was a 
troublesome one, in general he held quite firmly to the position that 
the statute, having been drafted upon a concept of corporate personality, 
had to be interpreted to require recognition of the entity in virtually 
every instance.22 For example, in United States v. Oregon-Washington 
16. 247 U.S. 330 (1918). 
17. Id. at 337. 
18. 287 U.S. 415 (1932). 
19. Id. at 420. 
20. See Cleary, The Corporate Entity in Tax Cases, 1 TAx L. REV. 3, 6-7 (1945). 
21. Smith v. Higgins, 102 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). 
22. ... [W]hen a statute is drafted upon a concept like that of the reality of corpo- 
rate personality, I do not see how that concept can fail to be determinative." Sage v. Com- 
missioner, 83 F.2d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 1936). 
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R.R. & Nav.,23 which was decided two months before Southern Pacific, 
the government sought to tax a subsidiary corporation whose indebted- 
ness to its parent had been cancelled by the latter. The taxpayer argued 
that the transaction should be ignored or treated as mere bookkeeping 
because of the substantial identity of interest between the two corpora- 
tions. Rejecting this approach, Hand found that the parent and subsidi- 
ary were entirely separate for tax purposes and that the debt cancella- 
tion resulted in an addition to the subsidiary's net assets, though he also 
concluded that the subsidiary's gain was not in the nature of taxable in- 
come. Similarly, in Nixon v. Lucas,24 decided 12 years later, a partner- 
ship owned all of the stock of a corporation which had admittedly been 
organized "for convenience" and to hold title to certain timber proper- 
ties. The partnership periodically advanced funds to the corporation to 
cover its annual deficits, and the partners, contending that the corpora- 
tion lacked independent substance, sought to treat the advances not as 
loans but as "contributions by the firm business as a whole to . .. a los- 
ing branch."25 Stating that if "a legal transaction arises between a com- 
pany and those who control it, the relations ensuing are the same as be- 
tween any other persons,"26 Hand held that the individual taxpayers 
were bound by their own choice of the corporate form and upheld the 
disallowance of the deductions. His position on recognition of the cor- 
porate entity in these and other early decisions thus seems to have been 
fully responsive to the obvious point that a statute which taxes corpora- 
tions under an independent schedule of rates, which contains a variety 
of rules applicable in particular to corporations and shareholders, and 
which makes no general distinction between closely-held and publicly- 
held corporations, simply cannot be interpreted to admit a sweeping 
principle of corporate disregard based on the factor of shareholder own- 
ership and control. 
But as straightforward and well-founded as it appeared to be, this lit- 
eral approach to the meaning of the word "corporation" proved inade- 
quate to deal with the kind of question presented in Helvering v. 
Gregory27 and in subsequent cases involving overtly conceived tax-mini- 
mization schemes. In the Gregory case the taxpayer caused her wholly- 
owned corporation to transfer certain property to a newly-formed corpo- 
ration whose shares the taxpayer also owned, and then within a few days 
23. 251 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1918). 
24. 42 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1930). 
25. Id. at 834. 
26. id. 
27. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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liquidated the new corporation and received the property previously 
transferred to it. These steps were concededly taken to avoid dividend 
treatment by complying literally with the tax-free reorganization pro- 
visions of the Revenue Act of 1928. The issue for the court was whether, 
despite such literal compliance, the taxpayer's motive to avoid taxation, 
or any other factor present in the circumstances, might justify a dis- 
regard of the reorganization form. 
The Board of Tax Appeals held for the taxpayer: 
As long as corporations are recognized before the law as if they were 
creatures of substance, there is nothing to distinguish [the newly- 
formed corporation] from innumerable others, whether they be de- 
vised to achieve a temporary tax reduction or some other legitimate 
end. Congress has not left it to the Commissioner to say. . . that the 
corporate form may be ignored in some cases and recognized in 
others. 
A statute so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal 
expression of the taxing policy, and leaves only the small interstices 
for judicial consideration.28 
Reversing the Board, Hand first confirmed there was nothing repre- 
hensible about minimizing taxes, and then, in a famous simile, dealt 
with the general issue of statutory interpretation: 
We agree with the Board and the taxpayer that a transaction, other- 
wise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, 
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to 
evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes 
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern 
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty 
to increase one's taxes. . . . Nevertheless, it does not follow that 
Congress meant to cover such a transaction, not even though the 
facts answer the dictionary definitions of each term used in the stat- 
utory definition. It is quite true, as the Board has very well said, 
that as the articulation of a statute increases, the room for interpre- 
tation must contract; but the meaning of a sentence may be more 
than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, 
and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the set- 
ting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.29 
But this willingness to abandon literalism in an appropriate case and 
to rely on liberal interpretation as a means of associating the statutory 
language with apparent legislative intent was plainly intended by Hand 
28. 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932). 
29. 69 F.2d at 810-11. 
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to be a grant of limited authority. Thus while upholding the Commis- 
sioner in finding a dividend, Hand also took the trouble to reject the 
theory on which the Commissioner had specifically relied: namely, that 
the organization of the new corporation and the transfer of the property 
to it by the old, being intended solely to avoid taxes, should be viewed as 
nullities; and, accordingly, that the taxpayer should be regarded as hav- 
ing received the property directly from the old corporation as a taxable 
dividend. Hand declined to adopt this analysis. Treating the steps taken 
by the corporations as "real" even though motivated only by a desire to 
avoid taxes, he found, nevertheless, that "these steps . . were not what 
the statute means by 'reorganization,' because the transactions were no 
part of the conduct of the business of either or both companies ...."30 
The statute, as he later observed in a paraphrase of the Gregory opinion, 
must be read to mean that "a corporation [created] only to serve as a 
means of transfer. . .. [W]as not a 'corporation' within the meaning of 
that term as Congress must be understood to have used it .... Such a 
corporation might be in some contexts a 'corporation'; but . .. in a tax 
statute 'corporation' could not have been so intended."931 Since the reor- 
ganization for this reason failed, the taxable event was the taxpayer's re- 
ceipt of the shares of the new corporation, such shares, of course, having 
a value equal to that of the property transferred by the old. 
Hand's approach, which the Supreme Court adopted in affirming his 
decision,32 was thus merely to interpret the language of the statute; that 
is, to construe a set of Code provisions embodying the definition of a 
"reorganization" whose meaning had theretofore been obscure.33 In so 
doing, as Randolph Paul observed, he "imparted into the statutory pro- 
vision, a meaning which made relevant the motive of the taxpayer in 
taking steps literally within the scope of the . . . reorganization provi- 
sion."34 The holding that the transaction was a device with no business 
purpose thus led to the conclusion that the transaction in that respect 
fell short of the definitional requirements of the statute. 
The decision in Chisholm v. Commissioner,35 which followed shortly 
after the Gregory case, also shows that Hand saw Gregory as having a 
limited function. In Chisholm the taxpayer, with his brother, granted 
a broker a 30-day option to purchase certain appreciated securities. On 
30. Id. at 81 1. 
31. Commissioner v. National Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 
U.S. 422 (1949). 
32. See note 11 supra. 
33. See R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 130 (1937). 
34. Id. at 152. 
35. 79 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1936). 
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being notified by the broker that the option would be exercised, the 
brothers formed a partnership to which they transferred the securities 
subject to option, and on exercise the partnership received the purchase 
price. Under the rule then prevailing "that when partners transfer prop- 
erty to the firm which in turn sells it, the taxation of any appreciation in 
its value before the transfer must await dissolution [of the firm],"36 the 
taxpayer reported no gain at the time of contribution. The Board of 
Tax Appeals, finding that the transfer represented "an abrupt departure 
from normal procedure, devised and adopted. . . solely for the purpose 
of avoiding liability,"37 held that the partners rather than the partner- 
ship should be treated as having sold the securities. 
The Second Circuit reversed. Emphasizing that the Supreme Court 
in Gregory had been "solicitous to reaffirm the doctrine that a man's 
motive to avoid taxation will not establish his liability if the transaction 
does not do so without it,"38 Hand determined that the parnership en- 
tity was fully entitled to recognition. The aspect of "transitoriness" that 
had been flagrantly present in Gregory was, he thought, lacking here 
since the taxpayer's purpose was to create an "enduring firm" and 
since the partnership did in fact continue to hold and manage the capi- 
tal jointly invested by the brothers. The entity thus served not merely 
"as a means of transfer,"39 but possessed a further economic function; 
and that, he thought, sufficed to put the case beyond the reach of Greg- 
ory. The business purpose requirement was deemed relevant to the sta- 
tus of the partnership as an entity, but once that status had been as- 
sured the same requirement evidently had no further bearing upon the 
characterization of transactions taking place between the entity and its 
beneficial owners. 
Against this background, the Supreme Court's decision in Higgins v. 
Smith40 undoubtedly surprised Hand-as it did others-because it ap- 
peared to go well beyond the Gregory decision, which it nevertheless 
cited as authority for its position. In Smith the Commissioner disal- 
lowed a loss claimed by an individual taxpayer on the sale of certain se- 
curities to his wholly-owned corporation. The corporation had been in 
existence for a number of years prior to the questioned transaction and 
while it apparently served primarily as a trading partner for its share- 
36. Id. at 15; see Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 
U.S. 594 (1935). 
37. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1334, 1345 (1934). 
38. 79 F.2d at 15. 
39. Cf. Electrical Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937), discussed in 
3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ?? 20.46, 20.56 (1965). 
40. 308 U.S. 473 (1940). The case arose prior to the predecessor of present Section 267. 
447 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.215 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 16:10:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 77: 440, 1968 
holder, the Commissioner did not suggest either that there had been a 
failure to transfer actual ownership in the securities to it or that the sale 
price was below fair market value. Instead his contention was that the 
loss had not been "sustained" within the meaning of the predecessor of 
Code Section 165(a). 
The case was tried to a jury in the district court, which was instructed 
to find whether the transaction was a transfer of property by Mr. Smith 
"into something that existed separate and apart from him" or was 
merely "a transfer by Mr. Smith's left hand, being his individual hand, 
into his right hand, being his corporate hand, so that in truth and in fact 
there was no transfer at all." The jury found that the latter was the situ- 
ation. The Second Circuit, in a decision in which Hand joined, reversed 
on the ground that the separate status of corporation and shareholder 
could not thus be disregarded,4' but the Supreme Court, through Jus- 
tice Reed, reinstated the verdict with the observation that the taxpayer's 
continued domination and control of the property transferred was "so 
obvious in a wholly-owned corporation as to require a peremptory in- 
struction that no loss in the statutory sense could occur upon a sale by a 
taxpayer to such an entity."42 The Court did not deny that an actual cor- 
poration existed or that a transfer of title had taken place, but held that 
neither was sufficient to justify recognition of the loss. Citing Gregory as 
"precedent for the disregard of a transfer of assets without a business 
purpose," the Court reached "the natural conclusion that transactions, 
which do not vary control or change the flow of economic benefits, are to 
be dismissed from consideration."43 
Confronted with its decision in the Commonwealth Improvement 
case, in which gain was recognized on a sale of property by a corporation 
to its sole shareholder, the Court asserted that the right to disregard 
transactions between a shareholder and his wholly-owned corporation 
belongs to the Commissioner alone and is a weapon against tax avoid- 
ance rather than a rule of law applicable to all corporate-shareholder 
dealings. Thus a taxpayer who elects to do business in corporate form is 
bound to accept the tax disadvantages-such as liability to the corporate 
income tax-of his election. The Commissioner is not similarly bound, 
however, and need not acquiesce "in the taxpayer's election of that form 
... which is most advantageous" to himself. At least this is true where, 
as here, the transaction was "unreal or a sham." In the latter event the 
41. Smith v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1939). 
42. 308 U.S. at 476. 
43. Id. 
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Commissioner "may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best 
serves the purpose of the tax statute."44 
Although nominally engaged in interpreting the words "loss sus- 
tained," the Court appeared to think that something more was needed to 
counter the taxpayer's ingenuity than could be found in an examination 
of the legislative history and intent of specific statutory terms or provi- 
sions. The emphasis on shareholder control and on "sham" suggests that 
Justice Reed was bent on arming the Commissioner with a broad form- 
piercing doctrine which could be employed in defense of the revenues 
even where the taxpayer had actually succeeded in meeting the require- 
ments of the statute. But while the Court apparently assumed that this 
doctrine would produce results similar or analogous to those that oc- 
curred in Gregory, the opinion failed to specify the conditions which 
would render the doctrine operative and did not make clear what the 
Commissioner would be authorized to do once those conditions were 
present. 
Subsequently, in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,45 the 
Court appeared to retreat somewhat from the forward position that it 
had taken in Smith. In Moline Properties the taxpayer-corporation con- 
tended that gains realized on a sale of real estate held in corporate name 
should be taxed to its sole shareholder rather than the corporation. The 
taxpayer had been formed as a security device at the demand of a mort- 
gagee, but also engaged in certain litigation in respect to the real estate, 
refinanced the property at one point, and for a brief period leased a por- 
tion of the property and received and reported the rents. The Court 
found that these activities were sufficient to compel recognition of the 
corporate entity for tax purposes and held the gains taxable to the cor- 
poration. Apparently intending its remarks to apply not only to a tax- 
payer seeking disregard of the corporate entity but to the Commissioner 
as well, the Court stated that "whether the purpose [of incorporating] be 
to gain an advantage under the law of the state of incorporation or to 
avoid or to comply with the demand of creditors or to serve the creator's 
personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the 
equivalent of a business activity or is followed by the carrying on of a 
business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable 
entity."46 The Court distinguished Higgins v. Smith, as well as Gregory, 
by stating that those decisions authorized disregard of the corporate 
44. Id. at 477-78. 
45. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
46. Id. at 438-39. 
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form (now, however, apparently at the Commissioner's insistence alone) 
only where the corporation was "a sham or unreal ... a bold and mis- 
chievous fiction"; and while it essayed no definition of "sham," it is 
clear from the way in which the Moline Properties opinion is structured 
that the Court now viewed the Smith decision as but a limited exception 
to the customary and much more general rule of corporate recognition. 
While the Smith decision was commended by some for its simple real- 
ism in dealing with an obvious effort at tax-avoidance,47 even those who 
praised it conceded that its rationale was-especially in view of Moline 
Properties-difficult to isolate. Hand, it appears, found the decision ex- 
tremely puzzling. His own construction of Gregory, as revealed in Chis- 
holm, emphasized a requirement of economic function in respect to the 
entity or other status for which the taxpayer claimed some consequence, 
and it was obviously a construction much more limited than the broad 
form-piercing doctrine that the Court seemed to support. Nevertheless, 
and while making no secret of his difficulty with it, Hand set about to 
apply the Smith decision in subsequent cases, stressing first one and then 
another of the several aspects of Justice Reed's loosely written opinion 
in an effort finally to comprehend its effect. 
Hand at first regarded Moline Properties as having confirmed his own 
approach to the tax status of the corporate entity and the proper con- 
struction of the Gregory case prior to the uncertainty introduced by 
Smith. He summed up the effect of the Moline Properties decision as 
follows: 
The gloss then put upon Higgins v. Smith . . . was deliberate and is 
authoritative: it was that, whatever the purpose of organizing the 
corporation, "so long as the purpose is the equivalent of business 
activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corpora- 
tion, the corporation remains a taxable entity." That, as we under- 
stand it, is the same interpretation which was placed upon corpo- 
rate reorganization in Gregory v. Helvering . . and which has 
sometimes been understood to contradict the doctrine that motive 
to avoid taxation is never, as such, relevant. In fact it does not 
trench upon that doctrine; it merely declares that to be a separate 
jural person for purposes of taxation, a corporation must engage 
in some industrial, commercial, or other activity besides avoiding 
taxation: in other words, that the term "corporation" will be in- 
terpreted to mean a corporation which does some "business" in the 
ordinary meaning.48 
47. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the 
Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 795 (1941); cf. Rudick, The Problem of Personal 
Income Tax Avoidance, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 243, 258 (1940). 
48. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 467-68 (2d Cir. 1944) (italics added). 
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Curiously, however, this expression of settled conviction about the 
relatively narrow importance of Higgins v. Smith-a conviction that the 
Smith decision was essentially of a piece with his own interpretation of 
Gregory-seemed to give way slightly in the National Carbide49 case, the 
last of his opinions dealing strictly with the status of the corporate en- 
tity. The question in National Carbide was whether income received by 
three operating subsidiaries was, as the taxpayer argued, taxable to the 
parent corporation rather than the subsidiaries, the former having fur- 
nished all of the subsidiaries' assets and having managed their entire op- 
erations. Finding that the subsidiaries could not be ignored for tax pur- 
poses once the parent had chosen to use them "as a convenient method 
of actually conducting . . . business," Hand nevertheless felt compelled 
to suggest or concede that the Smith decision might really have to be 
taken as having added something to Gregory or, perhaps, as having 
expressed a broader view of the Gregory decision than he himself had 
intended: 
It is true that Reed, J., also cited Higgins v. Smith as an authority 
in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner . . ., and it does not 
appear from the opinion in that case that the court thought that 
[Smith] had organized the Innisfall Corporation only to escape 
taxation, or for any other purpose which put it outside the fair 
intendment of the word. Certainly, we had not thought so, when 
the case was before us. The decision may therefore make it pos- 
sible for the Treasury at times to disregard transactions between 
its shareholders and [their] corporation even though it be a "cor- 
poration" in the sense we mean, although it must be confessed that 
the differentia is left open. We read that decision more broadly in 
United States v. Morris & Essex R. Co., but it does not follow 
that we should not be equally wrong to circumscribe it.50 
The paragraph last quoted shows that Hand now saw the Smith deci- 
sion as authorizing disregard "at times" of particular dealings between 
a shareholder and his corporation; and in that respect, at least, the 
decision appeared to add range to the Gregory principle. He also seemed 
fairly certain in the National Carbide opinion that the Supreme Court 
had in Smith intended business purpose to be a doctrine running solely 
in the Commissioner's favor and not a rule of law. But even then it re- 
mained unclear why a legal transaction with a valid entity involving 
no distortion of property values should have been considered "a bold 
49. Commissioner v. National Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 
422 (1949). 
50. Id. at 307 (footnotes omitted) (italics added). 
451 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.215 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 16:10:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 77: 440, 1968 
and mischievous fiction." This, in turn, raised doubts concerning the 
specific content of the business purpose requirement-"the differentia," 
as Hand put it. 
In summary, the cases discussed above show that Hand's characteristic 
interpretation of the Gregory doctrine was one which emphasized its 
limitations rather than its scope or breadth. This, perhaps, reflects the 
fact that in Gregory itself, as in the other decisions that have been 
mentioned, the problem of permissible tax avoidance was presented 
to him, at least in part, as if it involved the question of regard or dis- 
regard of the corporate entity. As a consequence, the business purpose 
requirement was apparently intended to do no more than establish 
a modest threshold of legitimacy, one which would exclude transitory 
legal arrangements in some instances and little else. In Hand's con- 
ception of it, the business purpose doctrine was thus in a sense an 
affirmation that form controls substance, but with the qualification 
that the form adopted must be functional in some respect. 
II. Application of the Gregory Decision 
As noted, Hand warned in the National Carbide opinion against too 
narrow a reading of Smith, and it is conceivable that in his struggle 
to domesticate the latter some reshaping of his own attitudes occurred. 
In any event, in what may be somewhat artificially regarded as a 
subsequent phase in the development of his treatment of tax avoidance 
problems, Hand apparently attempted to extend the technique of 
statutory interpretation adopted in Gregory to dealings between share- 
holders and corporations whose status as independent entities was 
otherwise unquestioned. These later decisions-notably Fairfield Steam- 
ship Corp. v. Commissioner51 and Commissioner v. Transport Trading 
& Terminal Corp.52 struck the tax bar as quite radical in their applica- 
tion of the Gregory approach, and they were generally criticized for 
having placed unwarranted restrictions on a taxpayer's previously ac- 
knowledged freedom to make an advantageous choice of form.53 
Both Fairfield Steamship and Transport Trading involved the distri- 
bution of an appreciated asset by a subsidiary corporation to its parent 
in advance of, but also in contemplation of, a sale of the asset to a 
51. 157 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1947). 
52. 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 916 (1950). 
53. See Bierman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated and Depreciated Property: 
Gain or Loss to the Distributor, N.Y.U. 8TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 792 (1950); Sutherland, 
Taxpayers' Motive as a Basis for Taxability, N.Y.U. 8TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 990, 1001 
(1950). 
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third party. In Fairfield Steamship the individual shareholders of the 
parent had determined upon a liquidation of both the parent and the 
subsidiary and had employed a broker to arrange the sale of the sub- 
sidiary's principal asset, a ship. Since the parent had losses which it 
could offset against gain to be realized on the sale, the subsidiary was 
liquidated and its assets transferred to the parent as soon as a satis- 
factory offer for the ship had been received, and the parent then entered 
into a formal contract of sale with the buyer. The Commissioner sought 
to tax the gain to the subsidiary, which had no offsetting losses, and 
was sustained by a majority of the Tax Court on the ground that the 
situation was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Commis- 
sioner v. Court Holding Co.54 
Affirming, Hand nevertheless agreed with the dissenters below that 
the negotiations in the present case had been carried on by the parent 
corporation and not by the subsidiary, and he therefore expressly de- 
clined to rely on the Court Holding Co. decision. Instead he held that 
the transfer of the ship from subsidiary to parent pursuant to a decision 
to terminate the venture was not a "distribution" in liquidation within 
the meaning of Section 112(b)(6) of the 1939 Code, which, like present 
Section 332, provided that a parent corporation shall recognize no 
gain or loss on the liquidation of a controlled subsidiary. That section, 
in his view, presupposed a "union in one corporate form" of a con- 
tinuing enterprise and not a winding up of the corporate business by 
both parent and subsidiary. Accordingly, he found "the situation . . . 
to be like that in Gregory v. Helvering . . . where although the tax- 
payer followed step by step the provisions of the statute, and was there- 
fore literally entitled to escape, the Supreme Court held that the section 
must be interpreted in the light of its purpose, and not merely as a 
verbal mosaic."55 
Despite the inapplicability of Section 112(b)(6), however, Hand's 
reason for taxing the subsidiary was by no means satisfactory or even 
clear. If, as he said, the liquidation was not within the Section, the 
only apparent consequence was that the liquidating distribution 
should have been treated as a taxable event to the parent, with the 
parent recognizing gain (or loss) measured by the difference between 
54. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). In Court Holding Co., the taxpayer-corporation had completed 
negotiations for the sale of an appreciated apartment building but abruptly called off the 
negotiations and distributed the building to its shareholders in liquidation. The share- 
holders then sold the building. The Supreme Court held that the corporation was taxable 
on the gain from the sale of the property on the ground that "the executed sale was in 
substance the sale of the corporation." Id. at 334. 
55. 157 F.2d at 323. 
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the value of the assets received in liquidation and its basis for the 
stock of the subsidiary. By itself, therefore, the inapplicability of 
Section 112(b)(6) did not justify a tax on the subsidiary; and once the 
Court Holding Co. decision had been found not controlling on the 
facts, the only issue left, as it seemed, was whether the subsidiary's 
act in distributing the appreciated asset by itself constituted a taxable 
"disposition" of the property. The latter question, however, had pre- 
viously been considered by the Supreme Court in the General Utilities56 
case and had been decided in a manner favorable to the taxpayer. Hence 
the Fairfield Steamship opinion seemed to resolve itself into nothing 
more than a substantial gaffe; and the commentators, disliking the 
result, were not slow to point that out.57 
Curiously, in view of this, Hand employed very much the same sort 
of analysis in the Transport Trading case, where a subsidiary corpora- 
tion distributed an appreciated asset to its parent as a dividend in 
kind. The parent promptly sold the asset to a purchaser whom it had 
previously secured, and having included the dividend in full (subject, 
however, to the 85 per cent intercorporate dividend credit), the 
parent claimed a basis for the property equal to its market value and 
reported no further gain. The Commissioner sought to disregard the 
dividend in kind and urged that the gain should be taxed to the sub- 
sidiary as if the latter and not the parent had sold the property. Hand 
agreed, reversing the Tax Court which had held for the taxpayer. In 
an opinion that drew heavily on Gregory and Fairfield Steamship, he 
reasoned that the distribution was not of the sort which 1939 Code 
Section 115(a) had been intended to cover. That section defined a 
dividend as a "distribution made by a corporation to its stockholder 
whether made in money or other property," and hence clearly included 
dividends in kind. This, however, was insufficient in view of the inter- 
pretive approach of Gregory v. Helvering, which, he said "means that 
in construing words of a tax statute which describe commercial or 
industrial transactions we are to understand them to refer to transac- 
tions entered upon for commercial or industrial purposes and not to 
include transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape 
taxation."68 Since the parent corporation had already determined to 
sell the property at the time it caused the subsidiary to declare the 
56. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
57. See Bierman, supra note 53; Kurz, A Critique of the Fairfield Steamship Case, 25 
TAXES 612 (1947); Note, Double Taxation Upon Sale of Corporate Assets, 56 YALE L.J. 379, 
382 (1947); Tax Notes, 32 A.B.A.J. 516 (1946). For a discussion of the current status of the 
Fairfield Steamship decision, see D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 648-52 (1966). 
58. 176 F.2d at 572. 
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dividend, the dividend "was not a distribution for the purposes of the 
parent's business, but only in order to escape a tax and such a 'distri- 
bution' is not among those contemplated in the Section."59 
Again, therefore, as in Fairfield Steamship, Hand's analysis turned 
upon the purported intent of a section which was not specifically di- 
rected at the tax treatment of the distributing corporation and hence 
might well be thought to have lacked sufficient relevance to be deter- 
minative. And even if the policy of Section 115(a) were conceded to 
be in some way relevant, his description of that policy seems ques- 
tionable. Thus a dividend generally requires no justification in terms 
of its relationship to the shareholder's business activities; certainly that 
is true of a cash dividend, and if so, why not also of a dividend in kind 
which is intended shortly to be reduced to cash? Furthermore, in con- 
trast to Gregory, neither Fairfield Steamship nor Transport Trading 
involved an effort to bail out earnings and profits through interposition 
of a transitory entity. Rather, both involved a bona fide sale of property 
to a third party; and it is not at all clear, even now, why normal com- 
mercial or industrial practice should be thought to require a sale of the 
property by the subsidiary followed by a distribution of the proceeds, 
rather than a distribution of the property followed by a sale by the 
parent. Hand's observation in Transport Trading that "the proceeds of 
the sale were in any event to reach the same treasury," would seem to 
leave in perfect equilibrium the question whether the parent or the 
subsidiary should be treated as the seller, and to provide no more sup- 
port for one conclusion than the other.60 
The Fairfield Steamship and Transport Trading decisions may be 
compared with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in the Court 
Holding Co.61 and Cumberland Public Service02 cases, which also pre- 
sented the question whether a corporate level tax should be imposed 
in the distribution-and-sale situation. Taken together the latter cases 
show that the Court ultimately settled on a factual distinction in this 
area, albeit one that rapidly reduced itself to mere form: if negotiations 
for the sale of the property were conducted by the shareholder in his 
individual capacity, then a distribution in advance of sale would be 
effective to avoid the corporate tax; if such negotiations were con- 
ducted by the shareholder in his capacity as corporate officer, a cor- 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Note 54 supra. 
62. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). See Cary, The 
Effect of Taxation on Selling Out a Corporate Business for Cash, 45 ILL. L. REV. 423 (1950). 
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porate tax would be imposed despite the distribution. 63To be sure, this 
approach led to absurdities in practice; yet it was difficult to suggest 
any other principle of an objective character that would actually suc- 
ceed in moving the problem away from dead center. 
For this very reason, perhaps, in appraising Hand's opinions in Fair- 
field Steamship and Transport Trading-with their confusing or mis- 
taken reliance on the policy of Code provisions apparently directed 
only or primarily at the distributee-the suspicion arose in some 
quarters that a motive test might really have been at work in his anal- 
ysis. Moreover, the key language of the Transport Trading decision 
-"transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape tax- 
ation" -together with the absence from that opinion of the familiar 
assertion that a purpose to avoid tax must be taken as neutral, seemed 
to provide some basis for the feeling that he had at last succumbed 
to the lure of a subjective standard, and that motive had become the 
touchstone.64 
But on the other hand this could hardly have been so-or else he 
wavered badly in his view of the matter-because the National Carbide 
case, which contains a forceful rejection of the notion that a "motive 
to escape taxation . . . is ever decisive," was decided two years after 
the Fairfield Steamship case and preceded by only a few months the 
decision in Transport Trading. Indeed within the same three-year 
period he wrote what is undoubtedly the most eloquent short defense 
ever to appear of the state of being tax-conscious and, by implication, 
of the art of tax planning: 
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing 
sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as 
possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for 
nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: 
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To de- 
mand more in the name of morals is mere cant.65 
While there is in this quotation a curious echo of Anatole France's 
classic irony about the law's impartiality, we have it on good authority 
that in speaking thus Hand "spoke . . . fervently."66 Certainly it is 
true that he had a "penchant for logical statement";67 and with his 
63. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS 391 (1966). 
64. See Sutherland, supra note 53. 
65. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion). 
66. Darrell, supra note 3, at 989. 
67. Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax, 44 YALE L.J. 436, 449 (1935). 
456 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.215 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 16:10:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Learned Hand: Tax 
obvious willingness (demonstrated by his struggle with Higgins v. 
Smith) to highlight rather than bypass the difficulties encountered in 
reasoning consistently about the problem of form and substance, it 
seems unlikely that he would have permitted himself, under cover of 
some novel inference about legislative purpose, to indulge an idea for 
which he usually reserved his best expressions of contempt. Never- 
theless, the Fairfield Steamship and Transport Trading decisions are 
confusing because they fail to make it clear why "function" was thought 
to be lacking in the circumstances under consideration. Moreover, 
although different Code sections were involved, both decisions seem at 
odds with the reasoning of the Chisholm case, in which a transfer of 
appreciated property in obvious contemplation of sale was approved 
on the ground that the transferee-entity could not be disregarded. 
Accordingly, even if a sweeping motive doctrine were excluded, there 
remained a question whether some version of the form-piercing doc- 
trine apparently adopted by the Supreme Court in Smith was really 
being applied. 
The assumption (or faith) that Hand did not intend at any time to 
abandon his resistance to a motive test receives additional support from 
his opinion in Loewi v. Ryan68 -a decision, however, which also serves 
to point up a major question in respect to the logic of his approach to 
tax avoidance. In Loewi the taxpayer had made a sizeable loan to an- 
other individual which was repayable on demand. The loan was secured 
by corporate stock plus a fractional interest in a stock exchange seat. The 
borrower never repaid any part of the loan, and although the taxpayer 
admitted that she knew as early as 1937 that collection apart from the 
security was hopeless, she did not foreclose on the security until 1944 
and in that year claimed a bad debt deduction for the unpaid balance 
of the loan. While the Code expressly allowed a deduction only for 
debts which were "entirely worthless," the government contended that 
the taxpayer's delay in liquidating the security was motivated solely 
by a desire to postpone the deduction, and that the bad debt should 
have been claimed in 1937 since it was then apparent that the bor- 
rower's capacity to repay was limited to the collateral. 
The issue was tried to a jury in the district court, which found for 
the government after being instructed that the postponement of a bad 
debt deduction could not be permitted solely because of the existence 
of valuable security unless the creditor's delay in liquidating was 
68. Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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"shown to have been in good faith and bona fide."69 On appeal the 
Second Circuit reversed, Judge Frank dissenting. Writing for the ma- 
jority, Hand stated that the privilege of a secured creditor to decide 
when to sell the property pledged could not be encumbered "with such 
conditions as 'good faith,' and 'common sense' or 'economic reality,' "70 
but on the contrary must be accorded "its full measure." A taxpayer, 
he said, is "privileged to liquidate his security for whatever purposes 
he thinks most profitable, among them the reduction of his taxes. It is 
so abundantly settled in decisions of the Supreme Court that a tax- 
payer's motive is irrelevant in determining his liability that we need 
not cite the very numerous decisions of the lower courts.'"71 
The Loewi decision is thus convincing evidence that Hand continued 
to find motive an unacceptable test of the sufficiency of form for tax 
purposes. Even more important, perhaps, it is also a reminder that 
Hand could, on occasion, give the statute quite a literal reading, and 
that he evidently did not consider business purpose to be a universal 
statutory requirement. Thus the business purpose issue was clearly 
posed by the trial judge's instruction. In the absence of any reasonable 
non-tax explanation for a secured creditor's delay in foreclosing his 
collateral, would it not be appropriate to imply foreclosure within a 
reasonable time after default and after it had become apparent that 
the debtor lacked independent means to repay the debt? Such a rule, at 
least, would place secured and unsecured creditors on an equal footing 
in respect to the bad debt deduction, while adding little to the burden 
of administering a provision which in any event requires a nice judg- 
ment about the year in which actual worthlessness occurs. It was no 
answer, as Judge Frank pointed out in his dissent, to assert that con- 
siderations of motive are generally irrelevant in tax controversies: 
rather, the question of importance was whether the bad debt section 
(like the reorganization provisions) might be said to require a showing 
of business purpose on the part of a secured creditor seeking to post- 
pone recognition, or whether the creditor is free to preserve the form 
of outstanding indebtedness even though nothing is achieved through 
delay apart from taxes. Hand's reaction, however, was quite clear 
and quite negative. He concluded his opinion by stating simply that 
"in the case of 'non-business debts' the existence of any security, not 
merely nominal in value, prevents the debts from being 'entirely worth- 
69. Id. at 628. 
70. Id. at 629. 
71. Id. The decision is criticized in Note, Secured Bad Debts: Manipulation of Deduc- 
tions by Postponing Liquidation of Security, 65 Yme L.J. 1045 (1956). 
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less,' "72 and in this way he made it plain enough that formal compli- 
ance was all that the bad debt section required. 
But this willingness to be literal, at least occasionally, and to exclude 
considerations of commercial substance in some instances, also raises a 
central question concerning Hand's technique of statutory interpreta- 
tion which the Loewi opinion does not attempt to answer. Thus why 
is formal compliance sufficient in some cases and not in others? Why 
is business purpose a necessary ingredient in reorganizations, liquida- 
tions and dividend distributions, but not in respect to the liquidation 
of his security by a credit or claiming a bad debt deduction? A resort to 
liberal interpretation in applying some but not all sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code may well be justified, but if so the justifying 
elements ought to be expressed. If they are not, then the process of 
selective application takes on an arbitrary and capricious look. Even 
this, perhaps, can be rationalized by saying, as it has been said, that 
the resulting uncertainty is to be valued for its in terrorem effect on 
"would-be tax manipulators." But once again, Hand's tireless rejection 
of "motive" as an explanation of the Gregory decision suggests that 
deterrence was never his objective. If anything is clear from his deci- 
sions in this field it is that he considered tax-avoidance to be respectable. 
It must be admitted, nevertheless, that the Fairfield Steamship and 
Transport Trading decisions do have an in terrorem quality. The rea- 
son for this is that the procedure employed by Hand and sanctioned 
by Gregory-that of reading unwritten definitional requirements into 
particular Code provisions-was unsatisfactory and unconvincing in 
those cases. Moreover, as the Loewi decision showed, the important 
question of when it is appropriate to resort to liberal interpretation in 
applying the statute remained largely, perhaps wholly, unresolved. 
III. The Gilbert Synthesis 
Hand's dissent in the Gilbert case-which marks his last major 
encounter with the subject of tax avoidance-is especially notable in 
view of the uncertainties discussed in the preceding sections both be- 
cause it bears upon the question of statutory interpretation raised 
by the Loewi decision and because it in some measure explains 
the curious results Hand reached in the Fairfield Steamship and 
Transport Trading cases. It also shows that after deciding the latter 
cases by applying the "living language" technique of Gregory, Hand 
72. 229 F.2d at 630. 
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still felt a need to return to and re-examine general principles. His 
attempt to reformulate the business purpose rule, setting it off between 
quotation marks73 as if confident of having found a permanent form 
of expression, was plainly the result of that re-examination. Although 
brisk and even cryptic at certain points, the Gilbert opinion ranks with 
the most important of his essays on tax avoidance. 
In Gilbert, the taxpayer and another individual were equal share- 
holders of a corporation which had engaged with little success in a 
variety of business ventures. The shareholders, together with the tax- 
payer's wife, had made periodic advances to the corporation roughly 
in proportion to their stockholdings, such advances being represented 
in part by interest-bearing notes. No payments were ever made by the 
corporation, either of interest or of principal. Having become insolvent 
the corporation was liquidated and the taxpayer sought to deduct his 
share of the advances as a bad debt. The Commissioner disallowed the 
bad debt deduction and was sustained by the Tax Court for the stated 
reason that "the advances . . . were, in reality, contributions of risk 
capital and did not give rise to bona fide debts on the part of the 
corporation.' 
The Second Circuit, finding that the Tax Court had failed to set 
forth adequate grounds for its conclusion, remanded the case for 
further proceedings. But in what might otherwise have been a fairly 
routine appeal, a panel consisting of Judges Medina, Waterman and 
Hand produced three separate opinions, of which at least two, Medina's 
and Hand's, were centrally concerned with the effect of the Gregory 
doctrine upon the taxpayer's status as creditor or shareholder. 
Judge Medina, writing for the court, applied the Gregory case in 
a conventional manner. That case, he said, is authority for the propo- 
sition that statutory terms are to be interpreted in the light of their 
context and underlying purpose, and not in a spirit of wooden liter- 
alism. An obvious consequence of adopting this canon of interpretation 
is that simulated transactions-transactions which in effect are nega- 
tived by "some secret agreement"-will be ignored for tax purposes. 
A further consequence, and one more serious to the taxpayer in Gilbert, 
is that even where a real transaction has occurred, the Commissioner or 
73. I would therefore substitute this which seems to me to . . . state the doctrine 
adequately: 
"When the petitioners decided to make their advances in the form of debts, 
rather than of capital advances, did they suppose that the difference would ap- 
preciably affect their beneficial interests in the venture, other than taxwise?" 
The burden will be on them to prove that they did so suppose. 
Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 412 (2d Cir. 1957). 
74. 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 688, 694 (1956). 
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a court may disregard it if the reality that has been achieved fails to 
accord with the meaning that Congress had in mind when it formulated 
the Code provisions in question. In this context the Commissioner or 
a court is entitled to inquire whether a purported loan is "indebted- 
ness" as that term is used in the statute, or is simply a contribution to 
capital. A federal standard governs that determination, and under it 
the significant question is "whether the funds were advanced with rea- 
sonable expectations of repayment regardless of the success of the 
venture or were placed at the risk of the business. . . . Finally, the 
latter question is to be answered by weighing certain key evidentiary 
factors, including debt-equity ratio, proportionate stockholding, and 
the presence or absence of normal creditor safeguards. The Tax Court's 
error, apparently, lay in its having collapsed the last step into the one 
before it; that is, in having concluded in short-hand fashion that the 
taxpayer's advances had been placed at the risk of the business without 
first having made specific findings with respect to the evidentiary factors 
just mentioned.76 
Hand's dissent is also built on the foundation of the Gregory case 
and relies on the familiar proposition that the "literal meaning of 
the words of a statute is seldom, if ever, the conclusive measure of its 
scope." On that base, however, Hand erected a structure quite different 
from the one created by the majority. His opinion begins with the 
flat assertion that the Tax Court was wrong in finding that the tax- 
payer's advances to the corporation did not create bona fide debts, 
"if by 'bona fide debts' one means debts that are valid as between [the 
taxpayer] and the corporation."77 The law is clear, he said, that debts 
to shareholders are, in the event of the corporation's insolvency, on a 
parity with debts to outsiders. An enforced subordination of share- 
holder-owned indebtedness might occur where the shareholder had 
made unconscionable use of his control position to injure the corpora- 
tion to his own advantage; but the mere fact that he possessed the 
opportunity to do so is not of itself sufficient to impose on him a fidu- 
ciary relation vis-a'-vis other creditors. Finding that the corporation's 
debt to Gilbert was in this sense bona fide, Hand evidently also con- 
cluded that the term "indebtedness" or "debt" as it is used in the 
Internal Revenue Code encompassed the notes in question. 
75. 248 F.2d at 406. 
76. On remand the Tax Court duly elaborated its findings and affirmed its previous 
conclusion. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29 (1958), aff'd, 262 F.2d 512 
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). 
77. 248 F.2d at 410. 
461 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.215 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 16:10:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 77: 440, 1968 
While the majority in Gilbert tested the purported debt by asking 
whether it possessed "substantial economic reality," Hand's simpler test 
asked merely whether the obligation actually created would have been 
treated as debt for nontax purposes. What is important in this, how- 
ever, is not that Hand was prepared to accept a different test of "indebt- 
edness" than the majority-indeed the two may well subsume many of 
the same criteria-but that his conclusion on that score did not end the 
enquiry for him. By contrast, if the majority had been as willing as he to 
say that since the obligation was debt for nontax purposes it was also 
debt within the meaning of the tax law, then quite obviously a judg- 
ment for the taxpayer would have followed. Hand, however, went on to 
superimpose a further requirement, relating not to the character of the 
corporation's obligation but to the legitimacy of the individual tax- 
payer's investment objectives. The crucial further question, as he saw it, 
was this: " 'When the petitioners decided to make their advances in the 
form of debts, rather than capital advances, did they suppose that the 
differences would appreciably affect their beneficial interests other than 
tax-wise?' "78 If they did not so suppose and in fact there was no such ef- 
fect, then presumably the bad debt would be denied. Hand thus ap- 
peared to believe, to turn his question into a statement, that in order to 
overcome the Commissioner's action in disallowing the bad debt deduc- 
tion, the taxpayer should be obliged to show that some appreciable non- 
tax consequence flowed or was expected to flow from his decision to in- 
vest in debt securities rather than additional shares of stock. 
In proposing this test, Hand evidently contemplated both that the 
corporate debt would be recognized as such and that the taxpayer might 
fail in his effort to demonstrate an investor business purpose. In other 
words the corporation could be treated as having valid debt outstand- 
ing, while the taxpayer, for want of a business purpose or an economic 
effect, might at the same time be denied a bad debt deduction. But 
since the total effect then appears somewhat anomalous, the question 
that obviously arises is how the two ideas can exist together, how a 
court could both respect the debt as such and still deny the deduction 
when the debt proved worthless. 
The answer, perhaps, is that in proposing an investor business pur- 
pose test Hand was focusing on the transaction between the taxpayer 
and the corporation, rather than (or after he had finished considering) 
the character of the security. The point is easier to see in the context 
of a payment of interest or principal, although it applies as well to a 
78. Id. at 412. 
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disposition of the debt through worthlessness. If, for example, a share- 
holder-creditor receives from his corporation cash purporting to be 
a payment of debt principal, there is at least a question as to whether 
the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction is the best or only 
one available. An alternate and equally plausible characterization is 
to say that there were two disconnected transactions, a contribution to 
capital by the shareholder in the form of cancelled debt, and a simul- 
taneous distribution of cash to the shareholder by the corporation. To 
put it otherwise, it is as consistent with events to say that the individual 
received the payment as shareholder as it is to say that he received the 
payment as creditor, and as consistent to say that the debt was cancelled 
as to say that it was paid. The same sort of observation can be made of an 
alleged interest payment, which in the alternative can be viewed as a dis- 
tribution combined with a cancellation of the interest claim. And 
where, as in Gilbert, an insolvent corporation is liquidated and transfers 
assets worth less than the face amount of its shareholder-owner indebt- 
edness, as an alternative to treating the debt as partly paid and partly 
worthless the transaction can be described as a voluntary cancellation of 
the entire debt by the shareholders and a distribution in redemption of 
the corporation's stock. In each case, as stated, the alternative description 
-under which the payment and the debt satisfaction are viewed as sepa- 
rate transactions-reflects the bare outline of events no less accurately 
than the form chosen by the parties, under which payment and debt sat- 
isfaction are viewed as an exchange. The question of which description 
to adopt is thus directly posed. 
Since he had already decided that the notes held by the taxpayer were 
valid debt, the test that Hand proposed in Gilbert could only have 
been directed at this further problem of how to characterize the partial 
repayment. Were the amounts received by the taxpayer from his cor- 
poration received as a creditor and in partial satisfaction of the debt, 
or were they received by him as a shareholder with the debt being 
cancelled as a contribution to capital? Rejecting the possibility that 
form alone might furnish the answer, Hand chose to place upon the 
taxpayer the burden of resolving the characterization problem by 
showing that the formal allocation actually meant something to him 
as an investor. The implication, quite obviously, was that in the absence 
of such a showing the Commissioner would be free to insist upon the 
characterization most favorable to the revenue. On the other hand, if 
the taxpayer could demonstrate that the status of corporate creditor had 
or was expected to have some appreciable economic effect on him which 
would not have occurred through stock ownership alone, then any 
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normal transaction which flowed from that status was bound to be 
recognized, for, as Hand said, "it would be absurd to hold that [the 
taxpayer] must deny himself an economic advantage unless he pay the 
tax based upon the facts that have ceased to exist. "79 In all this Hand 
raised no question of regard or disregard of the corporate entity, nor 
was any weight given to the presence of a motive to avoid taxation. 
Rather, Hand proposed an interpretative rule of general application, 
authority for which he purported to find in Gregory and Smith. That 
rule, briefly stated, was that ambiguous transactions were to be charac- 
terized in the Commissioner's favor, unless the taxpayer could dispel 
the ambiguity by showing that the form which he had chosen carried 
with it, or was expected to carry with it, some appreciable economic 
effect beyond tax savings. 
But the foregoing, even if an accurate description of Hand's aims in 
Gilbert, still leaves open the question of why he chose to write as a 
dissenter. Having found as a matter of law that a shareholder-creditor 
may participate on a parity with other creditors in bankruptcy, why 
was he nevertheless prepared to affirm the result reached by the Tax 
Court? The answer may lie, quite simply, in his evaluation of the sig- 
nificance to the taxpayer of non-subordination, remembering that the 
test he proposed in Gilbert was one of "appreciable" effect. Certainly 
79. Id. at 411. The phrasing of the "appreciable effect" test in Gilbert suggests that 
Hand viewed the question of investor business purpose as arising only at the time the 
debt securities were issued, that is, at the time "[w]hen the petitioners decided to make 
their advances ...." To be sure, the question would arise at that time, and it might, 
for example, be important in determining whether the shareholder had then received tax- 
able "boot" under Section 351 (supposing the debt to be of the short-term variety) and 
correspondingly whether the corporation's basis for any non-cash assets transferred to it 
should be increased thereby. See Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 193. It would not, 
however, be especially consistent with the approach suggested in the text for the character 
of subsequent transactions, such as purported payments of interest or principal, to be 
determined solely on the basis of the taxpayer's investment objectives at the time the debt 
was issued. Instead the "appreciable effect" test would seem properly to apply to each 
transaction at the time it occurs. It may be that Hand somewhat hastily assumed that 
the initial judgment concerning the presence or absence of investor business purpose would 
continue to hold good as long as the taxpayer's dual status as shareholder and creditor 
remained unaltered. Quite probably that is so as a practical matter, but it is also true 
that later events (most notably, a change from pro rata to non-pro rata holding of debt 
and stock) ought logically to have a bearing on the characterization problem as well. 
Of course the same theoretical need for a continuing review may exist even when, in 
conventional fashion, the classification of an instrument as debt or equity is made on the 
basis of factors relating to the corporation's capital structure, e.g., whether the ratio of 
debt to equity is "excessive" by some standard. A corporation whose equity component was 
found to be too thin to support debt classification in one year would presumably be free 
to raise the question again in a later year by issuing new debt securities against unrealized 
property appreciation or accumulated earnings, or, less clearly, by advancing the con- 
tention that the original securities which were issued as debt but reclassified as stock 
should now again be reclassified as debt because the equity proportion has in the mean- 
while become greater. In the end the problem of periodic reconsideration could be wholly 
avoided only by adopting a rule that the form of the instrument at all times controls its 
classification. 
464 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.215 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 16:10:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Learned Hand: Tax 
it is not unusual for the courts in tax cases to reject an allegation of 
business purpose on the ground that the purpose tendered is after the 
fact or too remote for serious consideration, even though such a rejec- 
tion necessitates a scrutiny of the taxpayer's motives.80 And since in 
the light of his own standard he should otherwise have voted to reverse, 
Hand's willingness to affirm the Tax Court suggests that he made just 
such an appraisal of the non-subordination factor. In effect, although 
sufficient in Hand's view to distinguish debt from equity, non-subordi- 
nation was simply not a factor likely to be regarded as important by 
the owners of a closely-held concern whose only source of unsecured 
investment capital was its shareholders. He would not, of course, have 
been alone in making that appraisal; nothing is more common in the 
literature on thin capitalization than the observation that it is "imma- 
terial to a shareholder-creditor from a nontax standpoint in many situa- 
tions whether his investment is in debt or equity form,"81 that "the 
category of shareholder-creditor is an unreal one,"'82 that in "the eco- 
nomic sense the two relationships are practically identical."83 
The same approach to the characterization of ambiguous transactions 
may also serve to explain the results Hand reached in the Fairfield 
Steamship and Transport Trading cases. As he had in Gregory, Hand 
found, in those decisions, that the applicable Code provisions contained 
unstated requirements which the taxpayers had failed to meet. The 
difficulty with the opinions, however, is that the Code sections in ques- 
tion do not seem to entail the tax consequences which Hand approved. 
80. Alden Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582, 598 (1959); Clearview Apt. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 246, 254 (1955). 
81. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE- 
HOLDERS 56 (1958). 
82. Id. at 58. 
83. Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Re- 
lated Problems, 16 TAX L. REV. 1, 76 (1960). A shareholder-creditor would presumably 
satisfy Hand's "appreciable effect" test in any case in which there was a non-pro rata 
holding of debt and equity. "As the investment pattern moves further and further away 
from strict pro rata holding, the investor who holds a disproportionate amount of debt 
securities progressively loses his identity with the shareholder's interests. He is less likely 
to subordinate his debt . . . ; he is more likely to foreclose upon a default in interest 
payments; and he is less likely to agree to a reissuance of new debt when the old falls 
due." Id. at 7. The courts have also occasionally found an independent business purpose 
for the issuance of debt to a controlling shareholder, Royalty Serv. Corp. v. United States, 
178 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mont. 1959), and of course the "genuine desire of the controlling 
shareholder to share with other creditors on liquidation may help to uphold the 
debt ...." Goldstein, supra, at 24. It may be added that under Hand's approach, which 
normally would not involve a reclassification of the debt securities, a debt instrument 
held by a non-shareholder would be treated as such even though acquired from a con- 
trolling shareholder, so that, for example, interest paid to the outsider would be deductible 
by the corporation. See Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXES 
830, 835 (1956); cf. R.C. Owen Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 369 (Ct. Cl. 1959), cert. 
denied, 363 U.S. 819 (1960). 
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On the other hand, the opinions do show that Hand was concerned 
with the character of the distribution itself, and not (as the Supreme 
Court was in Court Holding and Cumberland) with whether, in sub- 
stance, the corporation or the shareholder had made the sale. His atten- 
tion was on the transaction by which property was passed up from sub- 
sidiary to parent, and the question he sought to answer through 
analyses of the Code sections most nearly relating to that transaction 
was whether it was effective to avoid tax. But again, while the reorga- 
nization provisions were clearly at issue in Gregory, Sections 112(b)(6) 
and 115(a) do not appear to have had the same relevance in the later 
cases. 
By contrast, the Gilbert test would treat the problem in those cases 
as one of sheer ambiguity. Assuming, as Hand found, that the decision 
to sell corporate assets to a known buyer at an agreed price had already 
been reached, the act of distributing the assets in advance of sale ob- 
viously could have had no appreciable, indeed no remote, effect on any- 
one's beneficial interest apart from taxes. This is not to imply that 
the taxpayer's choice of form was any more or less artificial than that 
made by the Commissioner; indeed they appear to be equal in that 
regard. The point, however, is, that lacking any reason to separate the 
distribution and sale, one is left to view those events as if they had 
occurred simultaneously. But once that is said, the characterization 
problem is entirely up for grabs and the question simply becomes one 
of choosing between the Commissioner and the taxpayer. It is precisely 
that choice which the Gilbert test purports to make-not, as in Gregory, 
by finding that a particular Code section contains additional unstated 
requirements, but by holding that where a transaction is otherwise 
ambiguous in character the burden is upon the taxpayer to resolve the 
ambiguity through a showing of comparative advantage. Accordingly, 
if the Gilbert rule had then been at Hand's disposal, an outcome 
favorable to the Commissioner would at least have been indicated and 
foreseeable in the Fairfield Steamship and Transport Trading cases. 
The Gilbert rule is thus somewhat broader than the technique 
specifically employed by Hand in Gregory, and clearer, and it remains 
to consider how far and to what types of situations Hand intended 
that rule to extend. While one can do no more than guess at his in- 
tention on this score, it may be possible to get some idea of the range 
of his conception by enumerating the limitations on the scope of the 
business purpose requirement which he apparently thought it appro- 
priate to accept from time to time. Of these the most important can 
fairly readily be inferred from the Loewi decision, from his conclusions 
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with respect to the tax definition of "debt" in Gilbert itself, and from 
his continued and unfailing regard for the status of the corporate entity. 
As noted, Hand's approach to the bad debt deduction in Loewi 
was quite literal. In Gilbert, although a bad debt deduction was also 
at issue, literalism was put aside. The two cases can be reconciled, how- 
ever, on the ground that Loewi involved an act of forebearance on the 
taxpayer's part, while Gilbert involved an overt transaction, i.e., a 
distribution by the corporation purportedly in partial satisfaction of 
the taxpayer's claims. The latter transaction, once found to be am- 
biguous in character, was subject to the appreciable effect test. But 
the same test could not be applied to mere delay in the disposition of 
an asset. Thus no conceivable rule authorizing the Commissioner to 
recharacterize ambiguous transactions could be pressed so far as to 
override the general Code requirement of realization, and no such 
rule can alter the fact that the tax law takes no account of paper gains 
and losses. An investor owning property which has appreciated or 
declined in value relative to its basis is always free either to postpone 
the recognition of gain or loss by retaining the property, or to occasion 
recognition by selling it. Hand evidently viewed the taxpayer-creditor 
in Loewi as in the same status and saw no reason to suppose that the 
taxpayer's "privilege to liquidate his security" at a favorable time from 
the standpoint of tax benefit was any narrower than the privilege en- 
joyed by other investors-a position, incidentally, which found support 
in the Regulations relating to mortgage foreclosures.84 In this sense, 
then, Loewi was a "realization" case and the decision merely illustrates 
an obvious and inescapable limitation on the scope of the business 
purpose doctrine, one which would apply no matter what that doctrine 
might be understood to mean. 
Further, Hand's willingness in Gilbert to say that the definition 
of "debt" for tax purposes is roughly coequal with its definition for 
nontax purposes suggests that in his view the Commissioner's authority 
to disregard taxpayer choices also did not extend to the character or 
identity of an asset. Thus debt was "debt" whatever the taxpayer's 
purpose may have been in constituting himself a creditor. As he pointed 
out in Gilbert, the Gregory doctrine does not permit the Commissioner 
to impute to the owner of tax-exempt municipal bonds the higher tax- 
able return that might otherwise be received through the ownership 
of nonexempt securities. There may, in unusual cases, be some question 
84. Treas. Reg. 118, ? 39.23(k)-3(a) (1954), indicating that a bad debt deduction need 
not be taken by the mortgagee until the mortgaged property is sold. 
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as to whether a particular security belongs to the class of exempt issues; 
such a security must obviously possess certain identifying characteristics, 
and identification may occasionally present problems.85 The point, how- 
ever, is that the asset identification process stands apart from any further 
issue relating to the taxpayer's action in acquiring, retaining or dispos- 
ing of the property once it is identified, and rarely if ever would the for- 
mer involve a showing of business purpose. 
In the same vein, Hand's unvarying respect for the corporate entity 
suggests that he did not consider an investor business purpose test 
to be a condition of jural personality under the tax law. A corporation 
which does business, which functions in more than nominal degree, is 
entitled to be recognized as a taxable person; the Commissioner lacks 
authority to assert that the same activity might equally as well have 
been carried on in another form or individually. Hand did of course 
insist that a "corporation" have some nontax goal, and in that sense 
business purpose was included among the identifying characteristics 
of the corporate entity for tax purposes.86 But once the identification 
was made, nothing in the nature of an investor business purpose test 
could operate to deprive the corporation of its independent status under 
the tax laws. This is a point on which, despite Higgins v. Smith, Hand 
was never much in doubt; nor have the courts in general been especially 
uncertain about it. The Commissioner is still sometimes heard to con- 
85. See, e.g., Lewis & Loftis, The Tax Exempt Status of Local Government Bonds Used 
in Arbitrage Transactions, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 574, 578 (1967). 
86. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Paymer v. 
Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945) (a corporation which did nothing except take 
title to the real estate conveyed to it was a sham to be disregarded for tax purposes). It 
should be emphasized that Hand's idea in Gilbert is by no means a substitute for what 
was done in Gregory; rather it adds a second and, in a sense, a subsequent level of 
analysis. Thus Gregory is relevant to an understanding of the definitional requirements 
of particular Code provisions because it authorizes a court to push beyond literal content 
and to restate those requirements in terms which reflect the legislative purpose. Once 
fully understood, however, and apart from considerations of estoppel, the statute should 
be applied even-handedly and without regard to whether it is the taxpayer or the 
Commissioner who seeks its application. But see Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 
F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), containing dictum to the contrary. Gilbert, on the other hand, 
has relevance to a case in which a given transaction fits equally well into alternative 
legal categories and the only problem is one of choosing between them. Hand's dissent 
would confine this choice to the Commissioner, but it would not authorize him either 
to disregard or to add to the existing requirements of any Code provision. He could not, 
for example, by invoking his discretion to choose between equivalent forms, insist that 
a transaction be viewed as a "reorganization" if any of the definitional elements of a 
"reorganization" were lacking, Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); nor could 
he, under the same authority, by adding conditions to the statutory definition find that 
an attempted "reorganization" had failed, Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363 (D.C. 
Tex. 1961). In short, nothing in Hand's scheme would empower the Commissioner to 
alter legal categories to fit transactions, and hence the latter's opportunity to recharacterize 
would be limited, generally, by the presence in the Code of provisions which define 
particular transactions in detail. 
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tend otherwise, notably in cases involving the division of an existing cor- 
porate enterprise,87 but it is fair to say that on the whole the courts have 
not been persuaded to go beyond the relatively simple conditions laid 
down in Moline Properties and like decisions. 
Another and possibly a final limitation on the application of the 
Gilbert principle is one which, though not directly expressed in any- 
thing Hand wrote, can perhaps be inferred from the fact that he con- 
ceived of the business purpose requirement, and largely applied it, in 
the context of dealings between corporations and their controlling 
shareholders. The suggestion-and it is not a new one88-is that the 
Commissioner may lack authority to recharacterize transactions which 
take place between unrelated parties and which involve a negotiated 
price or other arm's length arrangements9 Thus, for example, the tax 
effect of using corporate funds to finance a shift of stock ownership 
between unrelated shareholders is apparently governed entirely by the 
taxpayers' choice of form. If a corporation owned equally by A and B 
redeems all of A's stock for cash, the result is a capital gain to A, the 
withdrawing shareholder,90 while B, the continuing shareholder, is 
considered to have received no portion of the distribution despite the 
increase in his percentage ownership."' Yet it is apparent that the 
same transaction could, in the alternative, be characterized either as 
(1) a payment by the corporation in satisfaction of B's obligation to 
purchase A's shares, in which event B would have a taxable dividend, 
or (2) a pro rata distribution to both shareholders with B using his 
portion to purchase all of A's shares, in which event A and B would each 
have a taxable dividend, with A's capital gain being cut in half. Presum- 
ably in this situation the taxpayer's beneficial interests are not apprecia- 
bly affected, apart from taxes, by their choice of procedure; yet it is gen- 
erally assumed,92 and the decided cases tend to confirm, that the 
87. Tillotson v. McCrory, 202 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1962). See also Siegel v. Commis- 
sioner, 45 T.C. 566 (1966). 
88. Cf. Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law 
to the Law of Taxation, 37 TUL. L. REV. 355, 388-89 (1963). 
89. There is of course no such inhibition when the question is one of appraisal or 
valuation, or depends upon some other factual determination. Thus, for example, a pur- 
ported lease may be characterized as a purchase if the "lease" contains a purchase option 
or is renewable at a price which is less than the expected value of the property. Starr's 
Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959). Similarly, on the sale of a business, 
the Commissioner is not bound by the allocation of the purchase price among the assets 
sold, even though buyer and seller are unrelated, but "is free to increase or decrease the 
amounts so allocated in accordance with the facts." Copperhead Coal Co. v. Commis- 
sioner, 272 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir. 1959). 
90. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 CUM. 
BULL. 167. 
91. Edenfield v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 13 (1952), acquiesced in, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 3. 
92. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 63, at 294-300. 
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Commissioner may not recharacterize a direct redemption of A's shares 
by insisting that the transaction could as well have been carried out in 
the form of a dividend to one or both of the parties. Since corporate- 
shareholder dealings are here present, the reason for the Commissioner's 
disability must be that the transaction is understood to represent an 
arm's length bargain between the shareholders with respect to the value 
of the withdrawing shareholder's interest, and is therefore properly to 
be regarded as an exchange. 
Precisely why this factor of arm's length dealing should assure recog- 
nition of the taxpayer's choice of form is difficult to state, although of 
course in the case just given the policy of Code Section 302(b)(3) is 
powerfully suggestive, at least as to A. More generally, however, it may 
be, as the Tax Court has suggested in another context, that the law 
intends that unrelated parties shall be free to "determine their tax 
burdens inter sese" by extending their bargain to embrace the tax 
consequences.Y3 This does not seem to mean that choice of form in 
arm's length dealings is always expected to produce a disadvantage 
to one party which is neatly offset by a corresponding advantage to the 
other, but it does suggest a realization that negotiations often take place 
against the background of an assumed set of tax consequences, and 
that these assumptions may be reflected in the terms, including price, 
on which the parties are finally able to agree. On the whole it seems not 
unreasonable for the Commissioner to be precluded from frustrating 
that agreement by redistributing the incidence of tax between the par- 
ties. This point seems especially strong where, as in the illustrative 
case, the possibilities for recharacterization are several and the Commis- 
sioner's choice might therefore bear more heavily on one party than 
the other. 
Whether for these or other reasons, it is apparent that the Gilbert 
rule has its principal and perhaps its only application in the context of 
self-dealing. This limitation, however, would not exclude the fact situ- 
ations in Fairfield Steamship and Transport Trading, nor indeed in 
Gregory itself, since all three cases, while an arm's length sale was ulti- 
mately in view, the transaction for which favorable tax consequences 
were specifically claimed was a distribution of property by a corporation 
to its sole shareholder. In these situations, as in Gilbert, the tax-deter- 
mining transactions took place between related parties, were am- 
biguous, and hence created problems of characterization under the 
tax law. As stated, the Gilbert rule prescribes that the ambiguity may 
93. Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 551 (1964). 
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always be resolved in the Commissioner 's favor, despite the taxpayer's 
choice of form, unless the taxpayer can support his own characterization 
through a showing of independent economic advantage. 
As a final observation on Hand's views in this area, it seems apparent, 
as stated, that he regarded the Gilbert principle as a one-way street, 
that is, as a rule authorizing the Commissioner either to bind the tax- 
payer by the form actually employed by him or to reject that form and 
put the taxpayer to his proofs. Such at least was the interpretation of 
Higgins v. Smith which Hand put forward in the National Carbide 
case, and it is a conclusion also strongly implied by the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Smith and Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co. 
when those opinions are read together. Quite obviously, the weapon 
thereby placed in the Commissioner's hands is a powerful one. Pre- 
sumably he can accept the form chosen by the taxpayer, as in Common- 
wealth Improvement; reject that form in favor of a higher-tax alter- 
native, as in Hand's version of Gilbert; or take a middle ground and 
subject the transaction to a standard of reasonableness based on arm's 
length dealings, as he has always done in the case of salaries paid by a 
corporation to a shareholder-employee. All this, however, is perhaps less 
arbitrary than it appears to be, considering the limitations on the scope 
of the business purpose requirement described above. What it suggests 
is a perception that the Internal Revenue Code is in part a clumsy 
system of implied elections, of which some, such as the choice to do 
business in corporate form, are freely exercisable by the taxpayer and 
binding on the Commissioner, while others, notably those involving 
self-dealing transactions, are within the Commissioner's discretion to 
approve or reject. 
To impute such a perception to Hand is of course to take great liberties 
with his occasional pronouncements on the subject of tax avoidance. On 
the other hand, it is plain that some sort of general restriction on choice 
of form was within his contemplation when he stated in Gilbert, as he 
had elsewhere, that "we cannot suppose that it was part of the purpose 
of the act to provide an escape from the liabilities that it sought to im- 
pose."94 This statement, though it may be taken even more broadly than 
is suggested here, at least supports the inference that Hand thought it 
unlikely, and at any rate pointless and self-defeating, that Congress 
should have included in its principal taxing statute both high-tax and 
low-tax alternatives which the taxpayer, in his sole discretion, would be 
free to choose between at will. 
94. 248 F.2d at 411. 
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When applied, as Hand applied it, to dealings between corporations 
and controlling shareholders, the Gilbert principle obviously strikes 
hard at a taxpayer's ability to reduce taxes by shifting capital funds in 
and out of corporate solution. For example, in addition to its effect on 
shareholder-owned indebtedness, Hand's beneficial interest test would 
readily extend to the purported sale of property by a sole shareholder to 
his corporation for cash. Since that transaction can as accurately be char- 
acterized as a contribution to capital and a concurrent cash distribution 
as it can a sale, the burden would be on the taxpayer to show that the sta- 
tus of seller had, or was expected by him to have, independent economic 
significance apart from taxes. An analysis of this sort, incidentally, 
would support the result in Higgins v. Smith, and it is perhaps notable 
that in citing Smith as authority for his approach in Gilbert, Hand for 
once appeared to be untroubled about "the differentia."95 
IV. Conclusion 
Hand's decisions in Gregory and Gilbert represent complementary 
efforts to deal with a major problem of statutory interpretation in the 
tax field, viz., when to accept the taxpayer's choice of form as determina- 
tive of his tax obligations. Gregory was a judgment in aid of rational tax 
administration. By rejecting literalism as a canon of construction, 
Hand's intention, and that of the Supreme Court, was apparently to 
limit tax avoidance to those situations in which the tax objectives sought 
by the taxpayer were not in plain opposition to those sought by Con- 
gress, at least as a judge might reasonably conceive of the latter. To this 
end the statutory definition of a reorganization was supplemented by 
95. Presumably for the reason that its effect has been felt to be too sweeping and un- 
conventional, the test that Hand proposed in Gilbert has had relatively little influence in 
the thin incorporation area to date. See Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 
39 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Goldstein, supra note 83, at 24. Its principal impact has been in 
the area of non-economic loan arrangements, in which an anticipated interest deduction 
is balanced off against a capital gain or in which an effort is made through the interest 
deduction to shift taxable income from one year to another. Knetsch v. United States, 364 
U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966). The courts, in 
general, have disallowed the interest deduction where the purported borrowing has no 
economic purpose apart from tax saving, and where the taxpayer would sustain a net 
economic loss on the transaction if taxes were disregarded. In the Knetsch-type situation 
the "lender" in effect collects a fee for serving as the taxpayer's nominal trading partner 
and for permitting the taxpayer to register an interest payment; in a clumsier era the 
same objective was sought through the medium of secret or tacit agreements. See Du Pont 
v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1941). It is perhaps notable that while in Knetsch 
the "lender" actively offered its services as an accommodation party, in the Goldstein case 
the lender was indifferent to and may even have been unaware of the taxpayer's objectives; 
yet the interest deduction was denied on the ground that the taxpayer lacked a non-tax 
purpose. 
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the additional requirement of business purpose. The decision showed 
that the Internal Revenue Code was to be interpreted in a free and lib- 
eral manner; accordingly, letter-compliance would sometimes be insuffi- 
cient from the taxpayer's standpoint. 
In application, however, the Gregory approach gave Hand (and 
the Court) some difficulty. In part, as Randolph Paul noted in com- 
menting on the Gregory case, "the trouble with dependence upon 
free or liberal statutory interpretation of a taxing statute, is that no 
one can be sure when it will be employed."96 Few now would quarrel 
with the effect of liberal interpretation in Gregory itself, but many 
indeed disputed its value in the Transport Trading case, while others 
criticized Hand's very failure to interpret liberally in Loewi. In the 
same way, the process of interpolating legislative purpose as a means 
of preventing tax avoidance proved unsatisfactory in the Fairfield 
Steamship case, Hand himself conceding in an addendum to the latter 
that his opinion "was elliptical and may cause confusion."97 In the light 
of these difficulties his dissent in Gilbert suggests that he may have come 
at last to the view that the technique specifically employed in Gregory- 
that of broadening the statutory definition by adding "something not 
written there"98 -was inadequate to the needs of sound tax administra- 
tion unless amplified. For the Gilbert dissent implies support for an in- 
terpretative principle of wider scope, one which deals directly and ex- 
plicitly with the fundamental problem of taxpayer inventiveness in ex- 
ploiting alternative forms and procedures, and does so by restricting the 
taxpayer's freedom to make an advantageous choice of form in a self- 
dealing context. It is a principle, also, which vests a very considerable, 
though not an unlimited, measure of discretion in the Commissioner, 
and in that respect perhaps reflects the approach taken by the Supreme 
Court in Higgins v. Smith. 
Hand's response to the Smith decision over a period of years is again a 
reminder that his "penchant for logical statement" made it difficult but 
also imperative for him to deal frankly with the subject of tax avoidance 
and the problems of consistency in statutory interpretation. It was not 
enough, quite obviously, to say that the subject is one for which general- 
izations are useless, since that saying, like many another in the field, is 
ultimately an "anodyne for the pains of reasoning."99 Hand was a sys- 
96. R. PAUL, supra note 33, at 265; see Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronounce- 
?flent On Tax Avoidance, 1961 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 135, 145. 
97. 157 F.2d at 323. 
98. Rudick, supra note 47, at 255. 
99. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1932). 
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tem-builder, whatever he may have declared to the contrary, and his con- 
tribution to the law of tax avoidance lay partly in his persistent effort to 
rationalize the administrative process. That effort, which certainly suc- 
ceeded in some degree, is an important feature of our tax history; it 
seems not unlikely that it will be an element in our future as well. 
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